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Promised by President Chirac during the 2002 campaign for the Presidential elections, 
the Environmental Charter has become the third pillar of the French 1958 
Constitution, along side the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
and the Declaration of Economic and Social Rights as incorporated in the Preamble of 
the 1946 Constitution. 
 
In his speech of 3 May 2001 in Orléans, President Chirac defined the stakes and 
significance of the proposed Charter. He notably stated that, 
 
 “(t)he right to a protected and preserved environment must be regarded as 
equal to civil liberties. It is for the State to lay down and guarantee this principle. And 
I wish that this public and solemn commitment be enshrined by Parliament into an 
environmental Charter attached to
2
 the Constitution and which would establish 
fundamental principles (…)”. 
 
Following this presidential initiative, Mrs Bachelot Narquin, the then  Minister of 
Ecology and Sustainable Development instructed  Professor Yves Coppens
3
 to preside 
over a commission, the mission of which was to analyse the economic, legal, social 
and environmental stakes of the proposed Charter and, on the basis of this analysis, to 
draft the Charter
4
. 
Since its passing by both Houses of Parliament, everyone living in France “…has the 
right to live in an environment which is balanced and respectful of health” (Article 1). 
 
As part of the French “bloc de constitutionalité” (the block of constitutional 
provisions), the Charter has now become a new legal reference for the French 
legislator. The Charter provisions will be protected, interpreted and enforced by the 
Constitutional Court as well as the administrative and ordinary courts. It will apply to 
all persons, natural and legal, private and public and will be used as an instrument for 
interpretation of all international environmental treaties and conventions signed by 
France. 
 
                                                 
1
This article is based on a paper presented at the Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference, 06-09 
September 2005, Strathclyde University, Glasgow. The author wishes to thank his colleague Dr. Jona 
Razzaque for her comments. However all errors remain solely the responsibility of the author. 
2
 The term used in French is “adossé à la Constitution”. This is a rather strange and unfortunate 
terminology. Literally, this means that the Charter and the Consitution are back to back.  
3
 Yves Coppens is a paleonthologist and professor at the Collège de France. 
4
 See Rapport de la Commission Coppens de Préparation de la Charte de l’Environnement (8 April 
2003) (the Coppens report),  
 http://www.charte.environnement.gouv.fr/UPLOAD/images/157_466_rapport_coppens.pdf. 
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Following an analysis of the reasons underlying the adoption of the Charter, its 
content, its significance and effectiveness are respectively discussed. 
 
1. Reasons for adopting an Environmental Charter 
 
In her letter to Professor Yves Coppens, Mrs Bachelot Narquin, stated that “France 
has already made commitments, at international and European levels, in a number of 
conventions and treaties, in favour of a sustainable development which bring together 
in a balanced way economic, social and environmental objectives. Our national law 
contains numerous technical norms that contribute to the protection of the 
environment. But a pervasive dimension and the establishment of superior 
fundamental principles are lacking. It is now time to give constitutional value to 
principles that we want to establish so that they become imperative for all.” 
 
1.1 The awareness of the global threat to the environment 
 
1.1.1 The need to respond to and address the concerns of the civil society 
 
It is undeniable that, in environmental matters, public opinion is exercising an 
increasing pressure on elected and non-elected decision-making bodies at 
international as well as domestic levels, notably through environmental associations 
or pressure groups, the role and influence of which over legislative and legal changes 
are more effective and proactive than that of political parties.  
In France, there are between 10,000 and 40,000 environmental associations or 
groups
5
. This clearly reflects the interest that the general public has in environmental 
matters and its general and growing awareness of the new environmental challenges 
that mankind is faced with in the 21
st
 century. The general public expect and demand 
an appropriate response to those challenges. 
As a result of this interest in the environment, a nation-wide consultation process was 
conducted by way of a questionnaire sent to 55,000 regional representatives and the 
setting up of 14 regional conferences, 4 of which took place in French overseas 
territories
6
. The consultation process simply confirmed that the majority of those 
questioned were favourable to the proposed environmental Charter, thus clearly 
showing their acute awareness of the need for a major form of action to protect the 
environment
7
. 
 
1.1.2 Bringing French law in line with foreign models of environmental 
protection 
 
While, at international level, France has actively participated in the development of 
environmental protection, she was lagging behind many European
8
 and non-
                                                 
5
 See M. Prieur, Manuel de Droit de l’Environnement (5th ed., 2004, Dalloz, Paris) at 119. 
6
 On the consultation process and its results, see 
http://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/article.php3?id_article=3680 
7
 See the Coppens report, (n 4) at 14. 
8
 See Art. 20a of the German Constitution, Arts. 45 and 53 of the Spanish Constitution, Art. 24 of the 
Greek Constitution, Arts. 9, 32 and 41 of the Italian Constitution, Art. 21 of the Dutch Constitution, 
Art. 64 and 66 of the Portuguese Constitution and Art. 2 of the Swedish Constitution. 
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European
9
 countries whose constitutions have recognised a right to the environment 
since the 1970s or 1980s. 
These constitutions either recognise a right to the environment backed by a duty to 
protect and preserve it
10
, or complement this general principle with more specific 
provisions which reflect their specific physical and geographical characteristics
11
.  
The adoption of the environmental Charter, and its incorporation into the French 
Constitution, elevate to constitutional level not only the right to the environment and 
its protection but also a whole elaborate set of principles of environmental law. In this 
way the French approach appears to be unique and more ambitious. 
1.2 The necessary completion of French environmental law 
 
1.2.1 The insufficiencies of French environmental law 
 
French environmental law can be traced back as far as 1810 and 1830 and has 
developed into a complex body of laws since the mid-1970s
12
 culminating into its 
codification in 2000
13
. However, the lack of reference to environmental protection in 
the Constitution was made all the more noticeable as environmental issues have been 
addressed in international and European laws. 
However, despite these developments, French environmental law had two major 
drawbacks. Firstly none of the environmental law principles occupy the place they 
hold politically in the legal hierarchy of norms. While the French Constitutional Court 
had ruled in its decision of 27 December 2002
14
 that environmental protection is an 
objective pursued in the general interest, it did not elevate it to a principle of 
constitutional force. As a result, any legislation on environmental protection could be 
reversed by subsequent Acts of Parliament subject, of course, to France’s 
international and European legal obligations. Furthermore, when reviewing the 
constitutionality of legislation under Article 61 of the Constitution, the French 
constitutional Court could not give the principle of environmental protection the same 
weight as that given to other principles or rights, such as the right to property, free 
movement, freedom of commerce and industry, etc. 
Secondly, because environmental principles had not been sufficiently defined in 
legislation, their interpretation was wide open to the discretion of the French 
administrative courts, which could potentially undermine legal certainty
15
. 
                                                 
9
 See Arts. 41 and 43 of the Argentinian Constitution, Art. 225 of the Brasilian Constitution and Art. 
19(2) of the Ecuadorian Constitution. 
10
 This is the approach followed in Spain for instance.  
11
 This is the case of Art. 225 of the Brasilian Constitution or Art. 24 of the Greek Constitution for 
instance. 
12
 The major laws are the Act nr 76-629 of 10 July 1976 on the Protection of Nature and the Act nr 95-
101 of 12 February 1995 on the Reinforcement of the Protection of Nature also known as the “Barnier 
Act”. While the former Act lays down the general principle of protection of natural areas and lands, 
conservation of animal and plant species, protection of natural resources, etc…, the latter mainly 
establishes the four major principles underpinning environmental protection, namely the precautionary 
principle, preventative and remedying action, participation and the polluter pays principles. 
13
 The adoption of the Environmental Code was done by way of the Ordonnance of 18 September 2000 
as adopted on the basis of the enacting Act nr 99-1071 of 16 December 1999 and as ratified by the Act 
of 2 July 2003, which authorised the Government to simplify the law. 
14
 Decision nr 2002-464. 
15
 For instance, despite the express reference in Art. L.110-1 of the Environmental Code to further 
legislation for the purpose of defining the conditions of application of environmental principles, the 
Conseil d’Etat, the French supreme administrative court, defined the precautionary principle as being 
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Finally, while the French administrative courts tend to follow the interpretation by the 
European Court of Justice of European environmental principles, upon which French 
law principles are based, the principle of the primacy of European Union law does not 
apply to the French Constitution as the Conseil d’Etat ruled in its Sarran decision16. 
This leads to a rather paradoxical situation. 
 
1.2.2 Thirty years of failed attempts to give environmental principles 
constitutional value 
 
Attempts to give constitutional force to environmental law principles are not new. In 
the past 30 years, many such attempts have failed. 
From 1975 to 1977, the Edgar Faure commission drew up a draft constitutional law 
on freedoms, including the right to a healthy and balanced environment. Article 10  of 
the proposed legislation of 15 September 1977 notably provided that “Human beings 
have a right to a balanced and healthy environment and have the duty to protect it.” 
The draft law was discussed in Parliament but not put to the vote for political reasons. 
Since then, a number of routes were explored to give constitutional force to a “right of 
the third generation”17. None of these approaches, from an amendment of the 
Preamble to the Constitution or even of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen to the insertion of a new provision in the constitution itself was 
successful. 
 
1.3 The need to give constitutional force to a fundamental human 
right 
 
1.3.1 Human rights of the third generation 
 
The first Article of the Charter lays down the “right to live in an environment which is 
balanced and respectful of health”; that is, a high quality environment which is 
favourable to human health. In this respect, the Charter adopts a similar approach to 
many European and non-European Constitutions
18
. As such, the recognition of 
                                                                                                                                            
legally binding and directly effective against the view of its commissaire du gouvernement (see 
decision of 11 December 1998 in case Association Greenpeace France). The court went on to extend 
its application to health. 
16
 Decision of 30 October 1998 (see D. Simon, “L’Arrêt Sarran: Dualisme Incompressible ou Monisme 
Inversé” (1999) Europe at 4) and confirmed by its decision of 18 December 1998 in the case of Parc 
d’Activité de Blotzheim. This is in line with its ruling in the case of Syndicat national de l’industrie 
pharmaceutique of 3  December 2001 in which the Conseil ruled that the “principle of primacy (…) 
could not lead, in the domestic legal order, to putting into question the primacy of the Constitution.  
17
 See N. Kosciusko-Morizet, Report on the Draft constitutional Law on the Environmental Charter, 
Report on behalf of the National Assembly Committee for Constitutional Laws, Legislation and 
General Administration, Parliamentary Session 2003 – 2004, Report Nr 1595, http://www.assemblee-
nat.fr/12/rapports/r1595.asp at 16. 
18
 However, the Charter goes further than the European Community Treaty or the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the Union, which do not deal with the environment in terms of human rights; 
see art. 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. II-97 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe), which provides that “(a) high level of environmental protection and the improvement of 
the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in 
accordance with the principle of sustainable development”. 
The right to live in a healthy environment was inferred by the European Court of Human Rights from 
the wording of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights in its ruling of 9 December 
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environmental protection as a human right is not new in itself but the Charter is 
innovating by creating in its Article 2 a duty for every person to “…take part in the 
preservation and the improvement of the environment”19.  This obligation, primarily 
of a moral nature, is imposed on all individuals, legal persons and public authorities.  
Inspired by a “humanist ecology”20, the charter is designed primarily to protect 
natural persons, who are the only persons to have rights under this Charter. Flora, 
fauna or land have no rights as such as the Charter does not endorse the “deep 
ecology” philosophy, which regards nature as having legal personality and rights. 
 
1.3.2 A declaration of rights purposely incorporated into the Constitution 
 
The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man, the Preambles to the Constitutions of 
1946 and 1958 were not originally intended by their respective draftsmen to be 
incorporated into positive law and subject to the supervision of the Constitutional 
Court. Their incorporation into the so-called “bloc de constitutionnalité” was effected 
by the Constitutional Court in the early 1970s
21
.  
Given those Constitutional Court decisions, the legislator was logically invited to 
incorporate the Environmental Charter into positive law by attaching it to the 
constitution, thus giving its provisions equal constitutional status and force to those of 
the 1789 Declaration and the 1946 and 1958 Preambles
22
. 
2. Content of the Charter 
 
2.1 The preamble 
 
The preamble has seven considérants or paragraphs which constitute a series of 
general statements. 
                                                                                                                                            
1994 in the case of Lopez Ostra v. Spain. More recently, in the case of Öneryildis v. Turkey of 18 June 
2002 (Chamber) and 30 November 2004 (Grand Chamber), the European Court relied on Article 2 
(right to life) to impose on States an obligation to ensure the protection of individuals against 
environmental risks which are likely to affect their life or their right to life. See D. García San José, La 
Protection de l’Environnement et la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (Council of 
Europe 2005). See also M. Déjeant-Pons, Le Droit de l’Homme à l’Environnement, Droit Fondamental 
au niveau Européen dans le Cadre du Conseil de l’Europe, et la Convention Européenne de 
sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales (1993, Council of Europe) and  "Les 
Droits de l’Homme à l’Environnement dans le Cadre du Conseil de l’Europe" 60 (2004) Revue 
Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme, 861.  
19
 The Preamble to the Constitution now refers to “the rights and duties as defined in the environmental 
Charter”. 
20
 See P. Gélard, Report on the Draft Constitutional Law on the Environmental Charter, Report on 
behalf of the French Senate Committee for Constitutional Laws, Legislation, universal Suffrage and 
General Administration, Parliamentary Session 2003 – 2004, Report Nr 352, 
http://www.senat.fr/rap/103-352/103-3521.pdf at 19, and N. Kosciusko-Morizet’s report, op.cit. at 63-
64. 
21
 See Decision nr 70-39 of 19 June 1970 and Decision nr 71-44 of 16 July 1971; see Dadomo & 
Farran, French Substantive Law. Key Elements (Sweet & Maxwell London 1997) at 151-153. 
22
 It is important to note that the 1789 Declaration and the Preambles enjoy the same legal force and 
none is regarded by the Constitutional Court as superior to the others. All three rules co-exist and have 
their respective scope of application. 
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The first two paragraphs make a general statement on the interdependence of mankind 
and its natural environment and on the indissoluble link between the environment and 
the current existence and the future of the human race. 
The third one re-iterates the universal dimension of environmental protection and that 
the environment is the common heritage of all human beings
23
.  
In the fourth paragraph, it is acknowledged that humans increasingly influence living 
conditions and their own evolution. This paragraph constitutes the basis for the 
principle of environmental liability laid down in Article 4 of the Charter. 
The fifth one refers to the effects on the environment of consumption and production 
patterns and the excessive exploitation of natural resources.  
The sixth one states that environmental protection is to be accorded the same 
importance as other national fundamental interests such as France’s independence and 
security, the protection of its population, etc
24
. It is therefore for public authorities to 
take account of the environment when defining new national policies. However, as the 
wording of this paragraph suggests
25
, environmental protection takes no precedence 
over other national interests. It will therefore be incumbent on the legislator to find 
the right balance between all national fundamental interests. 
Finally, the principle of sustainable development is given constitutional force in the 
seventh paragraph. It is defined as “the choices aimed at addressing today’s needs 
(without) compromising the capacity of future generations and other peoples to satisfy 
their own needs”26. The focus is therefore put on the concept of solidarity between 
generations and peoples. The Charter is designed to establish a balance between 
economic development, social progress and environment protection. A careful reading 
of the whole preamble shows that the principle of sustainability underlies each 
paragraph, thus giving the Charter its overall coherence.  
 
2.2 The Charter provisions 
 
The Charter consists of ten provisions. As mentioned above, while Article 1 creates a 
right for everyone to an environment which is balanced and respectful of health, 
article 2 imposes a duty to take part in its protection and improvement. Both 
provisions are of general character and, as such, the foundation of the Charter. Their 
application and effectiveness are dependent on the subsequent provisions: articles 3 
(duty of prevention), 4 (duty to remedy), 5 (precautionary principle) and 7 
                                                 
23
 As opposed to common heritage of mankind, the international law concept applicable to Antarctica 
and extra-atmospheric space and which carries legal effects. Here, the concept of heritage is more of an 
intellectual rather than of a legal nature. This concept must be regarded as having universal value only 
and not one to which the courts would give legal force.  
24
 Already Art. 410-1 of the Criminal Code already provides that “(t)he fundamental interests of the 
Nation comprise (…) its independence, the integrity of its territory, its security, the republican form of 
its institutions, its defence and diplomacy,  the safeguard of its people in France and abroad, the 
balance of its ecology and environment and the essential elements of its scientific and economic 
potential and its cultural patrimony” (underlined by us). 
25
 “(…) au meme titre que (…) i.e. “to the same extent as”. 
26
 Paragraph 8 of the Charter proposed by the Coppens Commission did not attempt to define 
sustainable development but referred to the “responsibility” of the French people “towards future 
generations” and “its will to promote a sustainable development based on solidarity between men and 
territories, which reconcile economic and social development with the preservation of natural resources 
and the improvement of the environment”. 
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(participation and access to information) provide the means of action necessary to 
ensure effective environmental protection and justice. 
 
The right to live in a balanced environment, respectful of health  
The scope of Article 1 is rather broad as it covers two concepts: that of a “balanced 
environment” and that of an “environment respectful of health”. The first one is 
understood as covering not only balances of ecosystems (conservation of biodiversity, 
low levels of pollution, etc.) but also the balance between urban and rural areas
27
. The 
second concept of “environment, respectful of health” is to be understood as an 
unpolluted and undamaged environment. This wording seems to be more neutral than 
that of “healthy environment” or that of “environment favourable to one’s health”28, 
which was the terminology used in the draft Charter of 27 June 2003
29
. Although the 
latter wording was more precise and specific than that used in the Charter, and was 
specifically aimed at protecting human health, it was conveying the idea that the 
environment had to further the health of each individual rather than health understood 
in its epidemiological and statistical dimension. The general term of “health” was then 
preferred to “one’s health”. Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to expect the 
environment to play a pro-active role in human health. If a damaged environment can 
have adverse effects on human health and living conditions, a balanced one does not 
necessarily have a noticeable favourable effect on health. For that reason, the idea of 
an environment which is respectful of health was preferred and adopted in the final 
draft
30
.  
 
The duty to protect and improve the environment 
As a counterpart to the rights created under Article 1, article 2 imposes on every 
person a duty to take part in the protection and the improvement of the environment. 
Such reference to duty (devoir) is not new and can be found in the Preamble to the 
1789 Declaration of Rights of man and the Citizen and in the fifth paragraph of the 
Preamble to the 1946 Constitution. As mentioned above, it is to be understood as a 
moral rather than a legal obligation imposed on all natural and legal persons
31
. 
However, this moral obligation has constitutional value which cannot be ignored in 
subsequent legislation. Each individual has a responsibility to ensure that natural 
resources are well managed and the environment is improved. However this 
responsibility can only be exercised within one’s individual limits as conveyed by the 
expression “take part in”. It is obvious that legal persons can play a more extensive 
active role in the preservation and improvement of the environment than natural 
                                                 
27
 See also Art. L.110-2 of the Environmental Code. 
28
 Underlined by us. 
29
 Paragraph 5 of the Coppens version of the Charter made a reference to a “healthy and balanced 
environment which respects one’s dignity and furthers one’s well-being”. The reference to dignity and 
well-being was there to convey the idea of a physiological as well as psychological tie between man 
and nature, contributing to man’s balance and happiness. This reference to dignity and well-being was 
dropped by the legislator on the ground that this could lead to litigation going far beyond the purpose 
and framework of the environmental Charter. 
30
 Originally suggested by the Committee for Economic Affairs of the National Assembly, this 
amendment was adopted by the National Assembly on 1 June 2004 and by the Senate on 24 June 2004. 
31
 Already, Article L 110-2(2) of the Environmental Code as incorporated by the 1995 Barnier Act, 
provides that “everyone has a duty to ensure the safeguard and contribute to the protection of the 
environment”. This provision has always been interpreted as imposing only a moral obligation. 
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persons. What matters however is that everyone is aware that environmental 
protection is a shared responsibility and a matter of concern for all. 
 
The duty of prevention 
Under Article 3, every person (natural and legal, public and private) has an obligation, 
within limits laid down by statute, to prevent any damage that he/she/it is likely to 
cause to the environment or, failing that, to limit the consequences of such damage
32
. 
The prevention principle is already recognised and well established under Article L 
110-1-II(2) of the Environmental Code, which provides that environmental damage 
must be redressed primarily at its source
33
. The Coppens draft Charter offered two 
alternative versions of this principle: in the first one, preventive action and remedying 
at source was given priority
34
; the second version simply mirrored the version of the 
Code
35
.  In the Code, the prevention principle is based on three components: the 
distinction between preventive action and the redressing of the damage at its source, 
the use of the best techniques available, and the acceptable economic cost. In the 
Charter, preventive action can only be defined in broad terms because of the general 
character of constitutional provisions and could not be laid down as an absolute 
principle as it is in the Code or in the Charter drafted by the Coppens commission. 
The primary role of the Charter is to guarantee a general obligation of prevention, 
whose conditions of application are to be defined further in statutory law as Article 3 
provides. Furthermore, the French legislator felt that, if given an absolute character, 
preventive action would clash with other constitutional principles such as freedom of 
enterprise
36
. The principle is also defined in broad terms with regard to its object. The 
environmental damage need not be certain for the prevention principle to apply as the 
terms “…likely to cause to…” suggest. The scope of application of the prevention 
obligation extends beyond that of major pollution accidents or industrial pollution. 
Unlike the precautionary principle which applies in the case of scientific uncertainty 
as to the existence of a risk of damage, that of prevention covers “(…) risks the 
existence of which is scientifically established and for which the risk probability can 
be objectively assessed by statistical analysis (floods) or by logical reasoning 
(calculation of probabilities).”37 Defined broadly as to its object, conditions of 
application and its addressees, the obligation of prevention was given a realistic 
objective too. Article 3 imposes an obligation to prevent any damage to the 
environment or, failing this, to limit the consequences of the damage. This certainly 
could be seen as a step back in comparison with the generally accepted definition of 
the prevention principle as this provision may give the impression that a potential 
polluter has a choice between preventing damage and limiting its effects. However, it 
                                                 
32
 Only the Swiss Constitution has a similar provision in its Article 74(2). 
33
 “The principle of preventive action and of the redressing, primarily at its source, of environmental 
damage, including the best available techniques at an economically viable cost.” It is to be noted that in 
the French version of this provision, the word “correction” (best rendered by “redressing” or 
“correcting”) is used instead of the term “réparation”  (best rendered by “remedying”). 
34
 “13. The preservation and improvement of the environment require, within conditions laid down by 
statutory law: 
- to give priority to preventive action and the redressing at the source of environmental 
damage.(…)”  
35
 “12. The preservation and improvement of the environment lie on the following principles: 
- the principle of prevention whereby damage to the environment and health must be redressed 
primarily at the source; (…)” 
36
 The Charter rights and principles must comply with other constitutional principles and values and 
have no precedence over them. 
37
 Opinion of the Economic and Social Council of 12 March 2003 on the Martinaud Report at 19. 
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could equally be argued that, any economic activity being capable of causing, directly 
or indirectly, some damage to the environment, the obligation of prevention as 
enshrined in the Charter should have the practical effect of encouraging methods of 
production and consumption with limited impact on natural resources and producing 
limited waste. Article 3 of the Charter seems to offer a realistic definition of the duty 
of prevention, which, as such, cannot be deemed to be in contradiction with the 
principle of preventive action as laid down in Article L. 110-II(3) of the Code as the 
latter provision does not guarantee the prevention of environmental damage in 
absolute terms either. Furthermore, Article 3 does not stop Parliament from passing 
legislation imposing an absolute duty of prevention in certain cases. 
 
The duty to remedy environmental damage 
Going hand in hand with the obligation to prevent environmental damage, that of 
remedying it is specified under Article 4, which provides that “(w)ithin conditions 
laid down by statute, every person must contribute to the remedying of any damage 
that he has caused to the environment.”. While the principle of civil liability38 as laid 
down in Article 1382 of the Civil Code
39
, which applies to environmental damage
40
, 
had already been given constitutional force by the Constitutional Court, there was no 
specific regime applicable to environmental damage
41
. Despite being attached to it, 
the “polluter-pays” principle is defined in Article L 110-1-II(3) of the Environmental 
Code as a principle whereby “the costs of prevention of, reduction of, and fight 
against pollution must be born by the polluter”. It is therefore viewed more as an 
obligation to prevent and reduce pollution rather than as an obligation to remedy any 
damage caused. The Coppens Commission itself was split on the issue as to whether 
or not the “polluter-pays” principle should have been included in the Charter: while 
some of its members were of the view that this principle was ambiguous and could be 
interpreted as a right to pollute and therefore should not be referred to in the Charter
42
, 
others believed that to exclude it would be a set back from the provisions of the 
Code
43
. The first position prevailed in the Charter for the following reasons. Firstly, 
although this principle is one of common sense and efficiency, it is only the answer to 
the issue of environmental damage viewed in narrow terms; while the financial 
burden is born primarily by the polluter, this does not prevent the victims of pollution 
                                                 
38
 On the ground of Article 4 of the 1789 Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen, which provides 
that “freedom consists in doing whatsoever  which does not cause harm to another”. See the 
Constitutional Court’s Decision no 82-144 DC of 22 October 1982. 
39
 This provides that, “anyone’s act whatsoever which causes harm to another, creates an obligation by 
whose fault it was caused to compensate it.” 
40
 Fault liability under Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code; Vicarious liability under Article 1384 
of the Civil Code and strict liability, as developed by the case-law of the courts on the basis of the 
theory of  “troubles du voisinage” (private nuisance). 
41
 With the exception of cases of dangerous activities where specific regimes of strict liability apply as 
a result of international obligations, such as nuclear accidents (Acts of 1968 and 1990) and maritime 
transport of petroleum products (Art. L. 218-1 of the Environmental Code). 
42
 The first alternative version  provided that “(t)he preservation and improvement of the environment 
require that, within conditions defined by statute: (…); 
- everyone pays towards the cost of  the  prevention and remedying of an environmental 
damage, which could be the result of one’s activity or behaviour.” 
43
 The second proposed version read as follows: “12. The preservation and the improvement of the 
environment lie on the following principles: (…); 
- the “polluter-pays” principle whereby it is incumbent on everyone to pay towards the costs of 
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage which could be the result of one’s activity 
or behaviour”. 
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from bearing the costs too, either as indirect victims or as tax-payers. As a principle of 
financial liability, it is not one of economic efficiency. Secondly, the principle does 
not necessarily provide a remedy for all environmental damage, notably for damage to 
natural habitats
44. Thirdly, the “polluter-pays” principle as laid down in the Code is 
not put into question by the Charter provisions as the latter integrates it in the wider 
dual dimension of prevention and remedying.  
Although Article 4 establishes no specific regime of environmental liability, it gives 
the principle of environmental liability constitutional force. 
 
The precautionary principle 
Unlike the principle of prevention which is of general application, the precautionary 
principle can only be triggered in exceptional cases as defined under Article 5. The 
Charter provides that “(w)hen the occurrence of damage, despite being uncertain in 
the light of scientific knowledge, could affect the environment in a serious and 
irreversible manner, public authorities must ensure, under the precautionary principle 
and within their competences, that risk assessment procedures are set out and that 
provisional and proportionate measures are adopted in order to avert
45
 the occurrence 
of damage.”46   
Originally formulated in German law as the “Vorzorgeprinzip” and incorporated in 
European Community law under former Article 130r(2) EC (now 174(2)) by the 
Maastricht Treaty as one of the fundamental principles of European environmental 
law, the precautionary principle was formally incorporated into French law by the 
Barnier Act in 1995. Article L. 110-1-II(2) of the Environmental Code defines it as a 
principle whereby “(…), the absence of certainty, taking account of current scientific 
and technical knowledge, should not delay the adoption of effective and proportionate 
measures which aim to prevent, at an economically acceptable cost, threats of serious 
and irreversible environmental damage.”47 This formulation has a few drawbacks: it 
pincipally defines it negatively; it is not clear whether it applies to private persons or 
public authorities and it does not clearly distinguish it from the principle of 
prevention. Furthermore, as the scope of application of the precautionary principle is 
                                                 
44
 For instance, it does not give rise to any financial support for the treatment and cleaning of birds that 
have been the victims of oil slicks. 
45
 In the original draft, the term “éviter” (to prevent) was used but was replaced by “parer à” to  
distinguish more clearly precaution from prevention. 
46
 This provision is the only one which expressly refers to a principle. The express reference to the 
precautionary principle gave rise to a debate within the Coppens commission which offered two 
alternative versions. The first one avoids all express reference to it on the ground that, scientific 
uncertainty preventing authorities from choosing the best course of action, precaution should only have 
a procedural dimension and be limited to taking appropriate measures following certain assessment 
processes. The advocates of the second version were of the view that the Charter would not be in line 
with European and domestic legislation, should it not expressly refer to that principle. Furthermore, 
only an express reference to the principle would make it fully legally binding (see the Coppens report 
at 39 and 40). 
47
 Compare with the definition given in the resolution of the European Council of Nice of 7 December 
2000 on the precautionary principle which provides that “…use should be made of the precautionary 
principle where the possibility of harmful effects on health or the environment has been identified and 
preliminary scientific evaluation, based on the available data, proves inconclusive for assessing the 
level of risk” (para. 7) and with principle 15 of the 1992 Declaration of Rio which reads as follows: 
“Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. 
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to be defined in further Acts of Parliament, its application by ordinary and 
administrative courts has been fraught with difficulty and has been rather limited
48
. 
As M. Boutonnet and A. Guéguan put it, “the legal birth and the spirit of the 
precautionary principle show that it cannot be understood, in a negative manner, as 
the instrument of an irrational requirement of a zero risk, but indisputably, in a 
positive manner, as a rational concern for ecological and sanitary safety”49. Along 
those lines, Article 5 provides a clear and rigorous constitutional definition of the 
principle, based on rationality and efficiency. It strictly defines its scope of 
application and the procedural rules for its implementation. Precautionary measures 
can only be triggered if three conditions are simultaneously met. First, there must be a 
threat of damage to the environment. It is clear from the wording of Article 5 that the 
precautionary principle as established in the Charter has constitutional force only in 
the field of environment and does not extend to other areas, notably health
50
. As a 
result, its scope of application cannot be restricted by an Act of Parliament when 
applied to the environment
51
. Lack of scientific certainty regarding the damage is the 
second condition. This allows a the line to be drawn between the scope of application 
of the precautionary principle and that of prevention. While the latter applies to a 
known or even potential threat, the former is a “principle of methodological action, 
the activation of which is dependent on a legitimate doubt about the existence of a 
threat”52. Finally, the threat of damage must have serious and irreversible 
consequences. While generally considered alternatively in international conventions
53
, 
those two criteria are cumulative in the Charter. The French legislator took the view 
that a cumulative condition was essential to assess effectively the threat of damage in 
a context of scientific uncertainty.  
Unlike Article L. 110-1-II of the Environmental Code, Article 5 of the Charter lays 
down strict procedural rules for the application of the principle. While the former 
provision does not specify to whom, private or public bodies, the principle applies, the 
latter makes it clear that it is for “public authorities (to) ensure, (…) that risk 
assessment procedures are set up and that provisional and proportionate measures are 
                                                 
48
 While ordinary courts have relied on the precautionary principle as now defined in the Charter less 
frequently than that of prevention, administrative courts tend to use it in the narrower context of 
procedural review of administrative measures and remain reluctant to assess the merits of 
administrative measures against it, safe in the case of erreur manifeste d’appréciation des faits  
(manifest error in the assessment of facts). Even the Constitutional Court refused to grant constitutional 
force to this principle (see decision DC 2001-446 of 27 June 2001 on the Act relating to abortion and 
contraception, notably paragraph 4: “(…) the precautionary principle is not an objective with 
constitutional force”). 
49
 See ‘Historique du Principe de Précaution’ in Annex 1 to Ph. Kourilsky & G. Viney, ‘Le Principe 
de Précaution.  Rapport au  Premier Ministre’ (La Documentation Française, 2000). 
50
Article 5 cannot be read in conjunction with Article 1 of the Charter which refers to “an environment, 
respectful of health”. The Charter is not a Charter on public health and the two areas remain separate 
and distinct. This distinction between health and the environment had been clearly maintained by 
administrative courts when applying the precautionary principle. However Article 5 would apply to 
threats of damage to the environment having effects on health. 
51
 However, when applied by the courts to other areas, the precautionary principle only has the force of 
courts’ rulings and its conditions of application can be extended or restricted by statute at any time. 
52
 Prof. G. Martin as quoted in Kourilsky & Viney, (n 49). in fn 224 at 65. 
53
 See Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and Art. 3(3) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change; see also the two alternative versions in the Coppens report: the first one refers to “a threat of 
damage ….that is serious and difficult to reverse…” while the second one refers to “a serious or 
irreversible threat” (underlined by us). 
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adopted (…)”54. Whether the principle should be applied by central government 
authorities only or by all public authorities was debated at length by the Coppens 
Commission. The second option prevailed in order to better reflect the territorial 
dimension of environmental protection and to maintain some coherence with the 
devolution process whereby powers in the area of environmental protection have been 
conferred upon local authorities
55
.    
In order to avert the occurrence of damage, public authorities have a dual obligation 
under Article 5: setting up risk assessment procedures and adopting precautionary 
measures
56
. Risk assessment involves research programmes
57
 aimed at reducing 
scientific uncertainty, dissemination of information regarding the means of preventing 
damage, the setting up of environmental control procedures and, above all, scientific 
expertise. In France, the latter has been given insufficient weight in most sectors
58
. 
Pluralistic and diverse, scientific expertise should be regarded as the “keystone which 
gives reliability to the decision-making process and ensures that litigation arising 
from it in the more or less long term is dealt with fairly.”59 Not only should the 
precautionary principle encourage interdisciplinary research - other than research 
based on a mere logic of economic profitability - and advances in scientific 
knowledge, but it should also help promote and reinforce the status of scientific 
experts
60
. 
Following an adequate risk assessment, public authorities can then adopt provisional 
and proportionate precautionary measures. Their provisional character is inherent to 
the principle of precaution. Unlike preventive measures which usually are definitive, 
precautionary measures must be regularly reviewed, amended or reversed in the light 
of new scientific knowledge and information on threats to the environment. They 
must also be proportionate to the seriousness of the threat of damage and to the 
duration of the research on that threat. Although Article 5 does not refer specifically 
to “an economically acceptable cost”, it is implied that the proportionality of the 
precautionary measures must also be measured in those terms. To verify that the cost 
of precautionary measures does not exceed their expected benefit, courts will have to 
apply the technique of “bilan coûts-avantages” which is widely used by French 
administrative courts and the European Court of Justice. However, its use will be 
made all the more difficult by the uncertainty of the threat of damage and therefore of 
the expected advantage derived from the precautionary measures, not only in the short 
term but also in the long run as the purpose of the precautionary principle is to protect 
future generations.  
  
                                                 
54
 Unlike Arts 2 to 4, Art. 5 does not impose obligations on private individuals. However these would 
have to comply with administrative or legislative measures implementing the precautionary principle.  
55
 Furthermore, the term “public authorities” can only be interpreted in the same way as in Article 7 of 
the Charter on the right of information and participation in reference to the 1998 Aarhus Convention.  
56
 Following an amendment to the draft Charter by the Legislation Committee of the National 
Assembly, risk assessment procedures are mentioned before precautionary measures, since risk 
assessment is more logically the first step in the application of the precautionary principle. 
57
 The second alternative version in the Coppens report actually referred to “research programmes” 
instead of “assessment procedures”. This version was preferred by a number of scientific experts for 
being more specific. However, the wording of Article 5 should be interpreted as widely as possible and 
should notably be read in conjunction with Article 9 of the Charter on research and innovation in the 
field of environment. 
58
 See Kourilsky & Viney, (n 49) at 96. 
59
 Ibidem at 95. 
60
 A step in that direction has already been taken with the creation of the French Agency of 
Environmental Health Safety under the Act of 9 May 2001. 
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As rightly summed up by N. Kosciusko-Morizet, Article 5 has set out a “dense web of 
obligations and requirements which turn the precautionary principle into a bastion of 
legal certainty in domains where safety is the condition for action”61. 
 
Promoting sustainable development and integration 
Article 6 provides that sustainable development must be promoted by public policies, 
which, to this end, “shall reconcile environmental protection and improvement, 
economic development and social progress”. Both principles of sustainable 
development and integration which are recognised in French environmental statutory 
laws
62
 are therefore given constitutional force under this provision. Far from being 
innovative, this provision merely lays down two principles that are widely recognised 
in the international, European and French legal orders.  
It requires that environmental protection and improvement, economic development 
and social progress, the three pillars of sustainable development, are equitably taken 
into account in public policies. In its original version, Article 6 provided that public 
policies “shall take into consideration environmental protection and improvement and 
reconcile them with economic and social development”. This could have been 
interpreted as not regarding environmental protection as the priority. During the 
parliamentary committee hearings, it was argued by some experts, rightly in our view,  
that the wording of Article 6 seemed to subordinate environmental protection to 
economic and social development, and as such was not reflecting the spirit of the 
principle of sustainable development. Professor M. Prieur, in particular, even 
suggested that Article 6 should provide that public policies “…shall reconcile 
economic and social development with environmental protection and improvement”. 
On the other hand, other experts took the view that, by mentioning environmental 
protection before economic and social development, Article 6 gave the former more 
consideration. Ultimately, adopting the view that the original wording of Article 6 
was not fully satisfactory as it could be interpreted either way, the National Assembly 
amended it so as to remove any ambiguity and to guarantee that equal consideration is 
given to all three components of sustainable development.  
In order to ensure that the objective of sustainable development has the widest 
possible impact, Article 6 also provides that it shall be integrated not only in policies 
on territories and the environment but also in all public policies as defined in statutory 
laws and regulations. It therefore extends the scope of application of the principle of 
integration beyond the limits laid down in Article L. 110-1 of the Environmental 
Code, and provides a constitutional foundation to existing laws
63
 which incorporate 
the integration principle. 
Under this Charter provision, Parliament has now the constitutional obligation to 
assess more carefully, and give more consideration to, the impact that any public 
policy may have on the environment and find the right balance between all three 
components of sustainable development. Consequently, failing to meet those new 
                                                 
61
 Op. cit. (n 17) 108. 
62
 The principle of sustainable development is referred to in the “Barnier” Act and Art. L-110-1 of the 
Environmental Code; that of integration is indirectly mentioned in legislation by reference to the 
former (see for instance, the Act of 1999 on  national and regional development and the Act of 2000 on 
solidarity and town redevelopment). 
63
 See, for instance, Art.  L. 123-1 of the Urban Planning Code, Art. 14 of the new Public Procurement 
Code or even  Art. L. 225-102-1 of the Commercial Code. 
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criteria, any newly adopted legislation could be reviewed and declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on the ground of “manifest error of 
assessment”. 
 
The right to information and participation 
Subject to conditions and restrictions as defined by law, Article 7 gives “(e)very 
person (…),the right to access information relating to the environment held by public 
authorities and to participate in the drawing up of public decisions which have an 
effect on the environment.” It gives additional constitutional status to two rights that 
are already fully guaranteed under the 1998 Aarhus Convention, the two European 
Directives of 2003 on Public Access to Environmental Information and on Public 
Participation in respect of the Drawing up of certain Plans and Programmes relating to 
the Environment, and in domestic law under Article L 110-1(4)
64
 and L.124-1 of the 
Environmental Code. As such, it should provide parliament with sufficient guidelines 
for the purpose of transposing the Aarhus Convention rules
65
 as filtered by the 
European Directives into an already abounding and diverse domestic law on the 
matter
66
. 
Unlike Article 1 which creates a right to a balanced environment for the benefit of  
individuals only (“chacun”), Article 7 is the only provision of the Charter that extends 
the benefit of a right to “every person” (“toute personne”). Like in Articles 2 to 4, this 
expression has to be understood as including all natural and legal public and private 
persons. In doing so, the provisions of Article 7 recognise the well-established  case-
law of the Constitutional Court and administrative courts extending the benefit of 
constitutional fundamental rights to legal private
67
 and public
68
 persons. 
In the Environmental Code, the two principles of access to information and of 
participation were not sufficiently and clearly distinguished
69
. Article 7 remedies this 
undesirable situation and defines them more neatly. In line with Article 4 and 5 of the 
Arrhus convention, the right of access to information applies to “information relating 
to the environment held by public authorities
70”. The interpretation of the concept of 
“environmental information” which has been traditionally based on the concept of 
access to administrative documents and, consequently, that of public service, had to 
                                                 
64
 Originally the principle of participation was strangely defined under the 1995 Barnier Act as a right 
“...whereby every person has access to information relating to the environment…”.  The 2002 Act on 
Démocratie de proximité (bringing democracy closer to the citizens) amended this provision by adding 
the right of the “…public (to be) involved in the drawing up process of projects which have an 
important effect on the environment or town and country planning”. 
65
 France is bound by the Convention both, as a contracting and ratifying party and as an EU Member 
State. 
66
 This is the result of successive layers of legislative intervention since the 1978 Act relating to various 
measures aimed at improving the relations between administrative authorities and the public. 
67
 See Decision 80-117 of 22 July 1980 relating to the Act on the Control of Nuclear Materials, in 
which the Constitutional Court recognised the rights of the defence of trade-unions; see also decisions 
on the application of the principle of equality to companies in Decision 81-132 of 16 January 1982 on 
nationalisations; to private and state schools in Decision 93-329 of 13 January 1994 on the Act relating 
to local government investment aids to private schools, etc… 
68
 On the application of the principle of equality to établissements publics (public corporations in 
charge of a public service), see Decision 79-112 of 9 January 1980 on the alleged fiscal discrimination 
against Electricité de France; to collectivités territoriales (devolved public authorities), see Decision 
82-138 of 25 February 1982 on the Act relating to the specific status of the region of Corsica; and to 
political parties, see Decision 89-271 of 11 January 1980 on the Act relating to electoral expenditures 
and transparency of the funding of political activities. 
69
 See footnote 64. 
70
 As defined under new Art. L. 124-3 of the Environmental Code implementing EC Directive 2003/4. 
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be broadened
71
 to comply with Directive 2003/4 on Public Access to Environmental 
Information as implemented by Chapter II of the Act of 26 October 2005
72
.  
With respect to the right of participation in the drawing up of public environmental 
decisions, Article 7 simply creates a procedural right for the public to be appropriately 
consulted during the decision-making process itself, the final decision being taken by 
the public authority. Here, the wording of Article 7 is significantly different from that 
of Article L.110-1(4) of the Environmental Code: every person can participate in the 
drawing up of public decisions rather than “the drawing up process of projects”, and 
the effect of such decisions need no longer be “important”73.  
In order to give this right more substance and clarity, some of the detailed provisions 
contained in Article 6 and 8 of the Arrhus Convention could have been inserted in 
Article 7. Unfortunately, the French legislator did not deem necessary to do so for 
stylistic reasons and on the assumption that further legislation implementing Article 7 
will have to be Convention-compliant. The principle of participation as enshrined in 
the Charter could gradually be applied to all sectoral policies, including economic 
policy, so long as any public decision has an impact on the environment.  
It should be noted that it was not deemed essential to insert the right to access to 
justice in the Charter in compliance with Article 9 of the Arrhus Convention. 
Although it is true to say that this right is already protected under the Constitution, as 
a right derived notably from Article 6 (equality before the law) and 9 (presumption of 
innocence and rights of the defence) of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen, it would not have been superfluous to establish this right  more firmly in 
the domain of  environmental protection. 
 
The role of education and training in environmental protection 
In his speech of 3 May 2001, President Chirac stressed that “(…)Because ecology is 
at the heart of citizenship, it must be a part of teaching programmes right from 
primary education, to teach our children the laws of nature and the actions to protect 
it”. Equally, the Coppens Commission emphasized that, one must learn and 
understand the consequences of one’s actions and choices, so that one’s behaviour 
does not harm the environment,. “A well-informed person can take measures to 
change his behaviour, his consumption and production habits so as to ensure the 
safeguard and the improvement of the quality of his living environment and that of 
future generations”74. 
By providing that “education and training must contribute to the exercise of the rights 
and duties provided for in the Charter”, Articles 8 establishes a direct link between 
education and the rights and obligations that every person has under this Charter. 
French law had no provision on environmental education and awareness similar to 
those of Article 3(3) of the Arrhus Convention. Article 8 fills this legal gap. However, 
it does not impose a strict obligation to change the content of the school curriculum 
but provides a general objective to include environmental education into school and 
university programmes as well as in continuing education. 
 
                                                 
71
 See new Art. L. 124-2 of the Environmental Code. 
72
 Act nr 2005-1319 relating to various provisions for compliance with Community law in the domain 
of the environment (OJFR, 27 October 2005). Chapter II of the Act amends Chapter IV of the 
Environmental Code on Freedom of Access to Information relating the Environment (see new Arts. L. 
124-1 to L. 124-8). 
73
 See n 64. 
74
 See op. cit. (n 4)  22. 
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Research and innovation 
As stressed in the Coppens report, research and innovation in the context of 
environmental protection and sustainable development are the basis for an enlightened 
opinion and responsible governmental decision-making, and the source of remedies 
and new means to reconcile development and environmental protection
75
. Like the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration, Article 9 of the Charter takes account of those two 
characteristics of research and innovation by providing that they “…must contribute 
to the protection and improvement of the environment”. By moving research and 
innovation in environmental matters into the constitutional sphere, Article 9 
reinforces the role of existing legislation which already encourages research aimed at 
improving the environment
76
. The objective of Article 9 is not, as it might be feared
77
, 
to restrict all research to environmental research programmes only. Its general 
wording rather seems to emphasize the pervasive nature of environmental research 
which too often suffers from a sectoral approach unsuitable for dealing with 
environmental problems in an effective and global way. 
 
The European and international policy of France 
Article 10 provides that “the present Charter shall inspire the European and 
international action of France”. This primarily stresses the fact that environment 
protection is meaningless without international action, and that France must play a 
leading role at international and European levels. 
 
3. The constitutionalisation of the Charter 
3.1 The process of constitutionalisation 
 
Once it had been agreed in 2004, the Charter had to be incorporated into the 
constitution by means of loi constitutionnelle (constitutional Act). This is an Act of 
constitutional amendment which must be adopted according to a special procedure 
under Article 89 of the Constitution. Article 89 provides that the amending Act must 
be approved in identical terms by both houses of  Parliament and then approved and 
adopted by referendum, or, as in this case – because the proposed Act originated from 
the Government - by a majority of three fifth of the votes cast in both houses of 
Parliament convened in a Congress.  
The Constitutional Act on the environmental Charter was adopted by the Congress on 
1 March 2005. It consists of three provisions, the second of which is the Charter itself. 
The first Article inserts into the Preamble to the Constitution a reference to “…the 
rights and duties as defined in the 2004 environmental Charter”.  
Under Article 3, protection of the environment is added to the legislative competence 
and powers of Parliament as defined in Article 34 of the Constitution.   
                                                 
75
 Ibid  23. 
76
 See particularly Art. L. 321-1 of the Environmental Code which provide that policies for the 
protection of the coastal line shall include research and innovation into its resources and distinctive 
features. Equally, Art. L.331-14 states that national parks authorities must participate in research 
programmes aimed at the economic, social and cultural development of the parks.  
77
 See M. Saddier, Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Law relating to the Environmental Charter, 
National Assembly Committee for Economic Affairs, the Environment and the Territory, (Doc. No 
1593  May 2004) 120. 
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3.2 Legal force and effect of the Charter 
 
3.2.1 Legal force 
 
By reason of its adoption in a Constitutional Act and of a reference to it in the 
Preamble to the Constitution, the Charter automatically acquires constitutional force 
and value in French positive law.  
 
3.2.2 Legal effect 
 
3.2.2.1 The reliance upon the Charter by individuals 
This issue is about the extent to which the Charter provisions can be relied upon by 
individuals in French ordinary and administrative courts either against other 
individuals or public authorities. According to the case-law of the Constitutional 
Court, a constitutional provision will have such an effect provided it satisfies three 
criteria: being a legal norm, a sufficiently precise one and an unconditional one i.e. 
not necessitating further legislative intervention. Applying those criteria, the Charter 
provisions could be divided into five categories:  
 
The Preamble   
 
As it makes general statements only, the Preamble can be deemed to be of a 
declaratory nature. However it will always be possible for the Constitutional Court to 
infer some constitutional principles from its interpretation
78
. 
 
Provisions with limited direct effect 
 
Because the effectiveness of Articles 1 and 2 is dependent on the application of the 
other provisions, those can be relied upon in the Constitutional Court, albeit not by 
individuals, but not in ordinary or administrative courts. 
 
Provisions with full direct effect 
 
The only provision with direct effect is Article 5 which clearly and precisely defines 
the conditions of application of the precautionary principle without the requirement 
for further legislation as under Article L.110-1-II of the Environmental Code.  
Subjecting the application of the precautionary principle to the adoption of further 
legislation would have contradicted its very purpose of setting up and clearly defining 
the procedures necessary to tackle serious situations of uncertainty. As such, Article 5 
appropriately lays down those general procedural rules.  
However, while it is not an absolute condition for the application of the principle, 
further legislation will be desirable and necessary to define in more detail certain 
aspects of its application such as the risk assessment procedures, the status of the 
experts, and general principles regarding the reviewability, reversibility and 
proportionality of precautionary measures to be taken by the public authorities. 
 
 
                                                 
78
 As it did with the principle of safeguard of the dignity of individuals which it inferred from the 
Preamble to the 1946 Constitution in its decision no 94-343 & 344 of  27 July 1994. 
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Provisions without direct effect 
 
Articles 3, 4 and 7 all refer to, and require further legislation (“subject to conditions as 
defined by law”), and as such cannot have direct effect79.  
 
Provisions imposing a line of conduct rather than an obligation 
 
Article 6 defines a line of conduct, that of promoting sustainable development, to be 
followed by public policy makers , and does not impose any imperative requirement 
upon them.  
Equally, Article 9 does not make require that research and innovation contribute to 
environmental protection and improvement. The same view applies to Article 8 on 
education
80
. Finally, under Article 10 the Charter is only supposed to be a source of 
inspiration for the French government at international and European levels.  
 
3.2.2.2 The effect of the Charter on the powers of Parliament 
The most innovative aspect of the Charter rests in the new constitutional requirements 
it now imposes on Parliament when legislating in the domain of environmental law. 
Parliament will only be able to pass new legislation which complies with the new 
constitutional principles laid down in the Charter. Although those principles are 
certainly guiding the making of French legislation, the constitutional value of the 
Charter will give them more weight and force as Parliament will have to take them 
into account when passing new laws that directly or indirectly concern the 
environment. Parliament will also be bound to make gradual amendments to any 
existing legislation which does not comply with the Charter principles. 
Furthermore, because the Charter has no superior legal value to other constitutional 
principles, Parliament will also and most likely have the uneasy task of reconciling 
the Charter principles with other constitutional principles, such as free enterprise, free 
movement, etc…as well as balancing that of sustainable development with economic 
development and social progress which also have equal constitutional force. This 
balancing act will necessarily have to be done under the watchful eye of the 
Constitutional Court. 
3.3 Effectiveness of the Charter 
It could be feared that Parliament will be put in a strait-jacketed and its powers further 
limited by the judiciary. However, by explicitly extending the competence of 
Parliament to environmental matters, Article 3 of the constitutional Act of 1 March 
2005 gives more incentive to Parliament to legislate in that domain. Article 34 as 
amended gives Parliament the power to implement the principles and rights of the 
Charter and make them effective. Parliament will have the power to clarify in 
statutory law the way a constitutional principle should be implemented without 
having to rely on an express provision of the Constitution.  
 
 
 
                                                 
79
 Note that, unlike Arts. 3 and 4,  Art. 7 not only mentions “conditions” but also “restrictions as 
defined by law”. 
80
 In all those provisions, the verb “doivent” (must) is used. An obligation would have been expressed 
by simply using the relevant verbs in the present tense, which in English, would be reflected in the use 
of “shall” before the verb.  
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Conclusions 
As former Prime Minister J.-P. Raffarin rightly stated in his address to Parliament on 
June 27, 2003, “(t)he Environmental Charter  will give a new impetus to the 
protection and the enhancement of the environment…” The incorporation of the 
Charter into the Constitution has given it the same constitutional status and force as 
the 1789 Declaration of Rights and the 1946 Preamble. This constitutionalisation of 
environmental law is a recognition that the right to a balanced environment has the 
same essential value as other fundamental rights recognised in the Constitution. It will 
also give environmental law principles greater unity and significance and an 
indisputable legal basis at the top of the hierarchy of French legal sources.  As the 
Charter principles and rights will be further developed and clarified in subsequent 
legislation, and interpreted by the Constitutional Court, ordinary and administrative 
courts will get better guidance for their enforcement. As such, the Charter will 
provide more general coherence to French environmental law and reduce the risks of 
conflicts, albeit limited, between domestic and international, and notably, European 
laws. 
Whether the French environmental Charter will serve as a model for other countries, 
as suggested by J.-P. Raffarin in his address to Parliament, remains to be seen but it 
should give France more credibility and legitimacy in international and European 
environmental negotiations. 
 
